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Germany: 
A look at one EU member state’s path to “Europeanization 
 
Victoria Quintana
♣
Introduction 
 
 
When the German forces surrendered in May 1945, Germany was government-less.  The country 
was eventually divided into four occupational zones: the British, the French, the American and 
the Soviet.  Eventually, the three Western Democracies, Britain, France and the United States, 
merged their zones to create a West German State: the Federal Republic of Germany.  The West 
Germans hoped that this republic might one day be replaced by the merging of east (the Soviet 
occupational zone) and west to create a single German state.  This did not come to fruition until 
1990.
1  With the reunification of East and West, Germany became the largest member state in the 
European Union.  Fortunately, because of the institutions already in place, from the years 
immediately following the war, this did not affect the balance of European peace and prosperity 
in any significant way.
2
  Germany was one of the original member states of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (“ECSC”), an organization that has evolved, through various treaties, into the 
European Union that we recognize today.  In fact, much of the reasoning behind the creation of 
an organization like the ECSC was to respond to the most important issue post-World War II: 
“what to do about Germany?”
 
3  The answer, according to the ECSC’s founding father, Jean 
Monnet, was to link Germany to other countries in Europe (such as France) in such a way that 
would make war between them impossible.  It was thus that, “France came up with a novel idea 
to reconcile Franco-German interests by pooling coal and steel resources under a supranational 
High Authority.”
4
Article I of the German Constitution states that “human dignity shall be inviolable.”  This 
provision has as its purpose the prevention of a second holocaust.  The atrocities lived through by 
the German state during the Second World War were deemed too terrible to allow such a thing to 
reoccur.  This mentality of making atrocities, or wars, impossible was also on the minds of the 
men who are responsible for the creation of the ECSC.
  
5  Apart from Jean Monnet, the European 
Union had another founding father: Konrad Adenauer.  These two men from France and Germany 
respectively – two countries that had fought three wars against each other in less than a one 
hundred year period
6
                                                        
    
♣ Victoria Quintana (Bachelor of Arts, University of Miami 2007; JD Candidate University of Miami 2010) is 
currently a third year student at the University of Miami School of Law.  As an undergraduate, she majored in Latin 
American Studies, French and Spanish.  Her undergraduate awards include the José A. Balseiro Hispanic Literature 
Student Scholarship, 2006-2007 and the Ann Colbert Memorial Award for Excellence in French, 2006-2007.  During 
that time she spent a semester abroad attending the Université de Paris IV, La Sorbonne in Paris, France.  She also 
spent a summer abroad in Santiago, Chile where she conducted research for her Honors Thesis entitled “One, Holy, 
Catholic and Apostolic NGO: The Role of the Catholic Church under the Pinochet Regime.” 
 - shared a common goal: to make certain that history would not repeat itself.   
   
1 Van Oudenaren, John.  Uniting Europe.  Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, pp. 6-8. 
   
2  Oudenaren, John.  Uniting Europe.  Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, p. 52. 
   
3 Bomberg, Elizabeth, John Peterson, and Alexander Stubb.  The European Union: How does it work? 2
nd ed.  
Oxford: University Press, 2008, p. 34. 
   
4 Bomberg, Elizabeth, John Peterson, and Alexander Stubb.  The European Union: How does it work? 2
nd ed.  
Oxford: University Press, 2008, p. 26. 
   
5 “The EU: A Community of Values.”  EU Focus.  Washington DC: Delegation of the European Commission to the 
US, Nov. 2005. 
   
6 Van Oudenaren, John.  Uniting Europe: European Integration and the Post-Cold War 
World.  New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001, p. 27.  
 
4 
4 
Konrad Adenauer was the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.  He was 
also instrumental in the drafting of the West German constitution as well as in the founding of the 
new, German Christian Democratic Party.  His participation in the latter political party would 
provide a common bond between himself and Jean Monnet (a member of the French Christian 
Democratic Party).
7  Adenauer envisioned the Rhine as a link, between France and Germany, and 
he deeply believed in reconciliation between them.
8
Adenauer’s ideas of reconciliation and peace between France and Germany were echoed 
by Monnet.  In 1950, Monnet came up with “the plan for a coal and steel community” uniting 
France and Germany, which he sold to other French politicians at the time.
 
9  Monnet describes 
this changing attitude of reconciliation in his Memoirs: “There was no doubt that something new 
and powerful was taking shape within our team: it was a European attitude...”
10  Monnet and his 
fellow Frenchman were thinking less as Frenchman and more as Europeans – and they did not 
have to look far across the Rhine to see that Adenauer was thinking the same thing.
11
In April of 1951, Monnet’s “plan” reached full fruition, as the ECSC.  This Community, 
which involved four other countries as well (Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), 
set the stage for true reconciliation.  For Adenauer, what mattered most was “that the initiative 
should have come from Paris.”
 
12  He saw the Parisian offer as a chance for Germany to show that 
it too valued peace above all else.
13
The goal of this new entity was “to ‘make war unthinkable’ and eventually ‘materially 
impossible.’”
   
14
Today the ECSC is found amid the pillars of the European Union.  However, it retains its 
historical importance.
  Adenauer, Monnet and the other European leaders of the time harbored vivid 
memories of the atrocities of war and this fueled their efforts to reconcile their countries, not 
merely because France and Germany had had enough of war and destruction, but because, Europe 
as a whole, had had enough as well.  They saw the ECSC as a tool to link the European states that 
signed on to it in a way that would make war against one another not just “materially impossible” 
but strategically and economically impossible as well. 
15  This importance is embedded in the question of whether or not the 
European Union has achieved what men such as Adenauer and Monnet envisioned in post World 
War II Europe.  Has the “European original sin for causing wars”
16
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European Union.
17
  This paper will precisely look at Germany’s path to “Europeanization.”  It will focus on 
three specific case studies that will demonstrate the relationship between Germany and Europe.  
The first case study will be on the German Constitution, which, from its creation in 1949, already 
demonstrated a tendency towards a more integrated Europe.  The second case study will be on the 
German Court system, specifically the German Constitutional Court (the highest court in the 
land) and its relationship with the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  How do these two legal 
entities relate to one another?  To what extent does the German court system apply the decisions 
of the ECJ?  To what extent does the ECJ support the decisions of the German Constitutional 
Court?  Finally, the third case study will look at the future of Germany and Europe, specifically, 
the “Europeanization” of Germany.  It will take into consideration the issue of immigration and 
citizenship – a crucial topic that hangs in the balance of the future of the European Union.  
  But, to what extent has the “European attitude” expressed by Monnet 
replaced that of a state-centric attitude?  To what extent have countries such as France and 
Germany been “Europeanized”? 
 
The German Constitution and Europe 
 
The Preamble of the German Basic Law states that it is, “inspired by the determination to 
promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe.”
18  Following the Second World 
War, a system of European values was captured in Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, adopted in 1949.  These values included restoration of “peace and economic prosperity 
[and the] safeguarding [of] civil and political rights and the rule of law.”
19  The goal of preserving 
these values, was, more than anything a response to Nazi Germany and a desire never to return to 
such a form of government.  Germany was looking to be accepted back into Europe, to better its 
reputation as a nation-state, and to be “on an equal footing again in the family of European 
states.”
20
  From the outset, Germany was open to European integration, as exemplified  by its 
European-oriented constitution.  Article 23 of the German Constitution “states that there is a 
constitutional obligation to further European integration.”  This was a constitutional amendment, 
which came into play on Dec. 25, 1992.  “The article expressly codified the limitations on a 
transfer of powers to EU organizations...The first clause contains a list of qualifications which the 
[European Union] must meet if a German transfer of power should be permitted.”
 
21
 
  Thus, 
however much Germany was leaning toward the greater Europe, its laws also took consideration 
to make certian that Germany would not lose its system of values (or Basic Law) embedded in the 
new constitution.   
The German Courts and the Eruopean Court of Justice (“ECJ”) 
 
Of all of the national courts of the European Union, the “German Constitutional Court has been 
particularly insistent on its co-equal status with the ECJ, even asserting…that it retained the right 
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to establish a threshold of constitutional guarantees and that the ECJ could adjudicate their 
application on a case-by-case basis.”
22
The ECJ stands as a symbol of European interdependence.  It is a binding force in the 
European Union - no one person or member state or institution is immune to its rulings.  Some 
have stated that the ECJ is a "perfect example of supranational legal integration."   This is seen 
not only through its defense and interpretation of treaties, but also through its independently 
created case law.   
 
One of the issues brought forth with the creation of the ECJ’s doctrine of supremacy was 
what to do about member states who had already addressed fundamental human rights in their 
constitutions.  The test case for how to deal with this was West Germany, whose Constitution 
(from 1949) protected fundamental human rights in Articles 1-19 of the GG, what is known as the 
Basic Law (or basic rights).  The German Federal Constitutional Court decided that the doctrine 
of supremacy was unacceptable.   Why should the German people concern themselves with the 
European protection of basic, fundamental rights, when these rights were already protected in 
their own constitution?
23
  The ECJ did not allow this dissent to go on for long.  The European court reasoned that 
the Treaties of the European Community “must be interpreted as requiring full respect for the 
constitutional traditions of the member states… [particularly] to the fundamental rights they 
guarantee.”
   
24
  Another example of the relationship between the German Court and the ECJ occurred in 
1974 with the 
  Thus, Germany’s fundamental rights remained protected and respected, and the 
doctrine of supremacy carried the day. 
International Handelsgesellschaft Case.  The “complainant asserted that European 
Law and the preliminary judgment which the ECJ had already passed in this  case were in 
contradiction with the principle of proportionality guaranteed by the German Constitution.”
25
…as long as the integration process has not progressed so far that Community 
law also receives a catalogue of fundamental rights decided on by a parliament 
and of settled validity, which is adequate in comparison with the catalogue of 
fundamental rights contained in the German Constitution, the Constitutional 
Court will rule on the applicability of the relevant rule of Community law, in so 
far as it conflicts with one of the fundamental rights in the Constitution.
  
The German Constitutional Court held that:  
26
 
 
  The ECJ responded to this decision by underlining the fact that the European Law 
interpreted by the courts was not only “written law” but also “unwritten law” – one that is a 
product of the “constitutional traditions common to the member states.”
 27  Furthermore, the ECJ 
emphasized that a respect for human rights fell under the unwritten constitutional traditions and 
that the human rights set forth in the European Convention of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms 
provided “evidential value for constructing this unwritten EU law.”
28
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Finally, in 1986, the German Federal Constitutional Court reversed its 1974 opinion 
stating, “That from now on constitutional complaints based on a violation of German 
constitutional rights by EU acts would be considered inadmissible.”  The German Court further 
stipulated that it would only retain jurisdiction on such cases if the claimant could show that the 
ECJ was not fulfilling its duties with respect to the protection of civil rights.
29
  A third example of German resistance to integration came with the creation and 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s.  Initially, Germany was a strong supporter 
of the “Europeanization” of certain matters such as immigration and police cooperation, as it was 
facing difficulties because of the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the integration of East and West 
Germany.
 
30  However, despite strong support from a majority in the German Parliament, the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was temporarily halted in the legal arena pending a decision 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court.  In October 1993, the German Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the treaty, thus finally allowing for its ratification, but the German Court 
remained critical of the “European Union’s democratic credentials.”
31  With this decision, the 
Constitutional Court established the following position: “future legislative, administrative or 
judicial acts adopted by the European Union that exceed the ‘program of integration’ will not 
have binding force in Germany.”
32
  Taking all of these examples into consideration, it is evident that although the German 
Court system has had its differences with the ECJ, the two court systems seem to compliment 
each other well.  Indeed, as more and more ECJ decisions survive the scrutiny of the German 
Constitutional Court, the ECJ gains more and more credibility as a supranational entity.  All the 
while, the German courts stand by; honoring its decisions, but ready to counter them should any 
fail to protect the basic human rights and European values espoused by the German Constitution 
as well as the decisions of the German courts. 
  Thus, the Maastricht Treaty, like the doctrine of supremacy 
survived German scrutiny.   
 
”Europeanization” 
 
At the end of the Cold War, Germany reaffirmed its goal of European integration.  The personal 
relationship of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand played 
an important role in this process; especially with respect to the creation of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (“EMU”).  
33  Germany was skeptical at first, and the Bundesbank (the 
influential German central bank) was in opposition to such a union.  However, the plan was 
already in motion by the fall of the Berlin wall.  Furthermore, the end of the Cold War provided 
another incentive for EMU.  Community leaders wanted to “bind Germany fully into the new 
Europe, largely through EMU” – Kohl obliged and overcame domestic opposition.
34
  Indeed, because of the positive experience that Germany had had with its European 
relations thus far, Kohl’s work was made easier – thanks in great part to the early work done by 
men like Adenauer.  Kohl’s decision to further Europeanize Germany with the elimination of the 
deutschmark, replacing it with the euro, was a symbolic as well as economic gesture.  Once again, 
the Germans were showing the French a renewed commitment to Europe.  According to Allister 
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nd ed.  
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Miskimmon, “The most visible sign of Germany’s commitment to European integration and the 
tying of Germany’s power into a multilateral framework is the Economic and Monetary Union.”
35
As part of the “visible sign” of the German commitment to Europe, the European Central 
Bank is located in Frankfurt.
 
36
     Mitterrand’s decision to endorse the reunification of Germany after much 
deliberation must be seen in this light that ‘the only way to circumscribe 
Germany’s growing power was to embrace it.  In the new situation, Paris could 
no longer maintain the illusion of previous decades that Germany would provide 
the brawn, France the brain, of Europe.
  This geographical fact inextricably links Germany to the 
European governing process in cities like Luxembourg, Strasbourg and Brussels.  What began as 
an economic union between France and Germany has become an even closer union.  With the 
creation of the EMU, France and Germany, and indeed Mitterrand and Kohl have seemingly 
followed the footsteps of their European forefathers: Monnet and Adenauer.   
37
 
 
Europe certainly was in a “new situation” at the end of the Cold War.  Just like Monnet had 
decided that rather than fight for a subdued German state, France should extend a hand and link 
itself to Germany in a way that would “make war unthinkable,” so too Mitterrand realized the 
importance of maintaining a united France and Germany.  However, this time, it was not so much 
because each country had something that the other did not, but rather because each country was 
European, and, looking toward the future of Europe, France and Germany should continue to 
work together, not as France and Germany, but as two European member states. 
  Although the EMU brought Germany closer to Europe, there still remain other important 
national and international issues that have prevented complete Europeanization.  One of these 
potentially divisive issues is immigration.  Today, in order to become a citizen of Europe, one 
must first become a citizen of a member state – will that ever change?  Each country in Europe 
has its own citizenship process – some more lenient than others.  This can sometimes lead to 
immigrants “member-state shopping” to find the one that will take them.  However, immigration 
has not been left completely unaddressed.  Perhaps the most important measure taken to address 
the issue was the creation of the Schengen Agreement. 
  The Schengen Agreement was signed by five member states in 1985 (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), and came into effect ten years later.  It removed all 
border controls among its signatories, which now includes fifteen European Union member states, 
as well as Norway and Iceland.  Ireland and the UK are not signatories, and Denmark has opted 
out of certain aspects of this agreement.
38 The idea behind the agreement was to erase systematic 
borders while strengthening external borders with non-Schengen countries.  Throughout the 
Schengen zone, law-abiding citizens can move freely.  However, illegal immigrants, organized 
crime groups and terrorists can also move freely once they have illegally made their way into one 
member state.  Thus, the entrance of one illegal immigrant, or criminal or terrorist into one 
Schengen signatory becomes a problem for all Schengen signatories.
39
One of the difficulties with immigration reform is disagreement between Member States.  
Europe as a whole may well be concerned with “uncontrolled immigration,” however; there are 
also “a variety of country-specific concerns –  ranging from widespread criticism of 
   
                                                        
   
35 Miskimmon, Alister.  Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: between 
Euroepanisation and National Adaptation  New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pp. 33-34. 
   
36 Bomberg, Elizabeth, John Peterson, and Alexander Stubb.  The European Union: How does it work? 2
nd ed.  
Oxford: University Press, 2008, p. 66. 
   
37 Miskimmon, Alister.  Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: between 
Euroepanisation and National Adaptation  New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p. 37. 
   
38 Bomberg, Elizabeth, John Peterson, and Alexander Stubb.  The European Union: How does it work? 2
nd ed.  
Oxford: University Press, 2008, p. 25. 
   
39 Bomberg, Elizabeth, John Peterson, and Alexander Stubb.  The European Union: How does it work? 2
nd ed.  
Oxford: University Press, 2008, p. 141.  
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Luxembourg’s bank secrecy laws to French criticism of the Netherlands’ policy on soft drugs.”
40  
Furthermore, prevalent in country-specific concerns is, specifically, illegal immigration.  Illegal 
immigration can be seen as a challenge to Europe as a whole, yet, it is understood that certain 
countries, and regions, are more heavily affected than others.  To further complicate matters, 
those who smuggle illegal immigrants into the European Union are constantly changing their 
routes.  For example, “[i]n 2004, the flashpoint for illegal immigration was Italy’s southernmost 
island of Lampedusa, but by late 2005, the hotspots were Malta and the Spanish enclaves of 
Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco.  In 2006, shiploads…[went to] Spain’s Canary Islands.”
41
Other discourses in Europe that involve immigration have centered around economic 
threat, solidarity, security, and positive diversity.
 
42  The economic threat brought on by 
immigration involves the availability of jobs (more specifically, whether or not immigrants will 
take jobs from citizens), as well as the cost involved in providing social services for immigrants.  
Solidarity connotes a dedication to the preservation of human rights and civil liberties, which are 
fundamental to the European Union.  Security involves border control and the prevention of 
certain crimes linked to immigration such as human trafficking, terrorist attacks, and drug 
trafficking.  Finally, positive diversity goes to the diversification of European culture, or 
“multiculturalism”.
43
It seems redundant to speak of a multicultural European Union with respect to 
immigration; after all, the 27 Member States brought together by the Union already create a 
multicultural entity.  However, this may be more of a country-specific concern as each Member 
State, secure in its European identity, is concerned with how uncontrolled immigration will affect 
its national identity.  For example, “[m]any French observers look with trepidation at the rise of 
multiculturalism [in France].”
   
44  In July of 2006, delegates of 58 European and African countries 
met in Morocco to address Europe’s immigration problem.  The following topics were on the 
agenda: “border controls, workplace enforcement, economic development south of the border, 
questions of assimilation and national identity.”
45
  “Germany was the strongest proponent of expanding immigration and police cooperation 
[within Europe].”
  A question arises as to whether the 
assimilation process will ever be one of European assimilation or if it will remain one of French, 
Spanish, or German (to name a few) assimilation.   
46  One of the reasons behind this was Germany’s proximity to Eastern 
European countries facing instability after the fall of communism.  However, according to 
Thomas Faist and Jürgen Gerdes, “[t]he politics of citizenship today is first and foremost a 
politics of nationhood.”
47  A “German” is defined in Article 116 of the German Basic law.  
48
Indeed, there are those who believe that Europeanization is a solution to this issue.   
According to author and economist Alain Minc, “‘In 20 or 30 years, there will be no more French 
  But 
where does one define “European”?   
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society but a European society…We will retain our language, culture, literature and wine, but as a 
people we will be European.’”
49
  Whatever the solution may be, the fact is that the European Union has a daunting task 
ahead of itself – one difficult to address amid such immediate concerns as the economy.  It 
remains to be seen whether Europe as a whole will come up with the solution, or differences 
between member states on the topic will continue to cause division.  Will German and French 
leaders come together again to bring about an even closer union once more?  Unfortunately, the 
relationship between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
does not seem as close as the relationship between former French and German heads of 
government.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
“‘This is no longer a Europe were the big three – London and Paris and Berlin – can call all of the 
shots…I think it’s in Germany’s enlightened self-interest to be seen as an honest broker, because 
that’s the way that it’s always had the most influence in Europe.’”
50  Ironically enough, one key 
example of German influence in the European Union did not come from Germany itself but from 
the German Länder, or states.  In the 1990s, they called for a greater role in determining European 
policy.  They were advocates in the creation of the Committee of the Regions.  Furthermore, 
under the Maastricht Treaty, the German states “won the right to send Länder ministers and 
officials to represent Germany in the Council of Ministers” of the European Union.
51
Thus, Germany itself is an example of how many parts can come together to make a 
whole.  What began as a unification of German states long ago, turned into a unification of East 
and West, and now the unification of a continent (Europe as a whole) is, and has been, part of 
Germany’s history and a key factor in its future. 
 
Germany is becoming a more normal state, both in terms of its attitude towards 
the use of military force, and in terms of its growing confidence in stating 
national interests in its dealings with its main partners, that is its conception of 
power.  Germany has not undergone a process of maladaptation defined as a 
retreat to national solutions to foreign policy challenges.  Germany has not 
reassessed its commitment to the EU’s foreign and security policy as a result of 
its improved international position since the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Adaptation 
where it has taken place, has taken the form of Europeanisation, where the EU 
has become a more important institution for the pursuit of German foreign and 
security policy interests.
52
  
 
It is a true testament to the work of men like Jean Monnet and Konrad Adenauer, as well as some 
of their successors, such as François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, that Germany, once an enemy 
to all of Europe, is now one of Europe’s most admired and respected nations. 
In the last decade, Germany has been on the edge of Europe.  It has a long history of 
moving toward European integration with the creation of its Constitution, while at the same time 
resisting integration in the interest of its Constitution.  The German Presidency of the Council 
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which began on the 1
st of January of 2007 sought the advancement of a policy to “tighten ties 
between Russia and Europe”, taking into account the interests of the other former Soviet bloc 
countries as well.
53  It also sought an increase in internal stability of the European Union.  Indeed, 
Germany’s geographical location lends itself to a position of a liaison between East and West.  At 
the same time, it seeks to support the Europe that brought Germany back to life after suffering the 
atrocities of a world war.  However, its work is not yet done.  According to one European scholar, 
“[o]n matters of the achievements of the Communities and the Union and on the values of 
integration, Germany should assume a real leadership in current and future issues, doing more 
[than merely reminding us of past glories].”
54
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